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INTRODUCTION 
Alan Turing, in his famous 1950 paper, “Computing 
Machinery and Intelligence,” wrote, “we may hope that 
machines will eventually compete with men in all purely 
intellectual fields.”1 This distant aspiration, expressed in the 
context of whether a machine can be indistinguishable from a 
human,2 may soon be a modern-day reality as technological 
breakthroughs bring science closer to developing machines 
endowed with natural intellect—the concept of artificial 
intelligence (AI).3 Over the past decade, advancements in big 
data, machine learning, algorithms, and computational power 
have brought research surrounding AI to new heights as the 
world looks to technology to address society’s greatest 
                                                          
 1. See Alan Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 236 
433, 460 (1950), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251299?origin=JSTOR-pdf 
(considering the question of whether machines can think). 
 2. See Steven Harnad, Minds, Machines and Turing: The 
Indistinguishability of Indistinguishables, 9 J. OF LOGIC, LANGUAGE, & INFO. 
425 (2000), https://www.jstor.org/stable/40180236?seq=1 (describing the Turing 
test as a test of whether a machine can act indistinguishably from a human). 
 3. See Max Tegmark, Benefits & Risks of Artificial Intelligence, FUTURE 
OF LIFE INST., https://futureoflife.org/background/benefits-risks-of-artificial 
-intelligence/ (defining general and narrow concepts of artificial intelligence); 
see also NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2016) at 6, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/micr
osites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf (offering alternative 
definitions of AI concepts and suggesting a problem-solution taxonomy for 
defining AI). 
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challenges.4 However, just as our understanding of the 
technology progresses, so does the complexity of the underlying 
social and legal issues presented by computer systems that may 
one day be fully capable of making decisions exclusive of human 
intervention.5 
AI has in recent years been thrust to the vanguard of 
technical development as nation states, private industries, and 
researchers seek to comprehend and exploit its potential.6 While 
society has often embraced scientific advancements designed to 
augment and better the human experience, the foreseeable and 
speculative perils of AI create uncertainty surrounding its 
proliferation across society.7 Despite this debate, it is likely that 
AI will be a disruptive force across industries, and cybersecurity8 
is no exception.9 As security and privacy move to the forefront of 
business considerations, corporations and governments are 
increasingly turning towards automated processes to ensure 
compliance, avoid liability, and streamline operations in an era 
of big data.10 The application of AI technologies to cybersecurity 
is in a novel state; however, fully autonomous network defense 
                                                          
 4. See NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3 at 7 (summarizing current 
developments that represent the state of AI as of 2016). 
 5. See Tomaso Falchetta, Profiling and Automated Decision Making: Is 
Artificial Intelligence Violating Your Right to Privacy?, UNITED NATIONS RES. 
INST. FOR SOC. DEV. (Dec. 5, 2018), http://www. 
unrisd.org/TechAndHumanRights-Falchetta. 
 6. See NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 35 (discussing 
challenges of AI in the context of international relations and role of AI in 
international conflicts, including armed conflicts). 
 7. See Tegmark, supra note 3 (noting that “the boundaries of AI can be 
uncertain and have tended to shift over time”). 
 8. Cybersecurity is a subset of information security. For the purposes of 
this paper, cybersecurity refers to preventing, detecting, and responding to 
cyberattacks. Network security is a subset of cybersecurity that focuses on 
protecting data sent through or stored on networks. This paper focuses at times 
on network defense systems to highlight the underlying legal and policy 
considerations associated with information security and cybersecurity. For 
brevity, this paper does not fully detail various cybersecurity techniques. Only 
where necessary to build upon the legal analysis does this paper expound on the 
underlying technical considerations. 
 9. See NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 35 (noting that AI 
already has an important role in cybersecurity). 
 10. See Travis Greene, Explaining the ‘New Normal’ in Cybersecurity to the 
C-Suite, FORBES (Sept. 12, 2018), https:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/09/12/explaining-the-new-normal 
-in-cybersecurity-to-the-c-suite/#3e668cf568a8 (describing the increased focus 
on cyber risk management by executive boards). 
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systems may be at society’s doorstep.11 Autonomous 
cybersecurity systems are expected to offer significant 
advantages in an era where the threat landscape is continuously 
expanding, and resources are increasingly strained.12 
Autonomous cybersecurity systems are driven by data, and 
the European Union General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) is an unavoidable moderator in this regard.13 The GDPR 
places significant restraints on the collection and use of data in 
Europe.14 Moreover, the extraterritorial nature of the regulation 
compounds the impact it has on global industries.15 This paper 
is designed to expand discussion surrounding AI, cybersecurity, 
and data privacy through an exploration of the GDPR and the 
legal challenges this regulation poses for autonomous 
cybersecurity systems.16 This paper contends that today’s AI-
based cybersecurity systems are likely capable of complying with 
the GDPR.17 However, absent a technical solution, maintaining 
compliance will becoming increasingly difficult as these systems 
achieve greater autonomy.18 Part I of this paper examines the 
practical and technical aspects of AI-based network defense 
systems. This includes a foundational exploration of the utility 
of autonomous network defense, current limitations and long-
term prospects, and a brief technical overview of how AI is 
applied in the cyber domain. Part II examines the GDPR and 
analyzes the key privacy implications and legal challenges that 
                                                          
 11. See NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 36 (describing 
automated cybersecurity systems that have been developed, which represent a 
first step toward “the development of advanced, autonomous systems that can 
detect, evaluate, and patch software vulnerabilities before adversaries have a 
chance to exploit them.”). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and Council of 
27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), Article 2, 2016 O.J. L 119/1 
[hereinafter GDPR]. 
 14. See GDPR, art. 5; see also Part II Section A, infra. 
 15. See generally Bhaskar Chakravorti, Why the Rest of the World Can’t 
Free Ride on Europe’s GDPR Rules, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 30, 2018), 
https://hbr.org/2018/04/why-the-rest-of-world-cant-free-ride-on-europes- 
gdpr-rules (explaining that the global nature of information technology has the 
effect of imposing Europe’s GDPR Rules on the rest of the world). 
 16. See Part II Section A, infra. 
 17. See Part II Section B, infra. 
 18. See Part II Section C, infra. 
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this regulation poses for the development of AI-based network 
defense systems. Part II concludes with a discussion of 
legislative considerations for any future US data privacy law. 
Some that have been suggested include exemptions for data 
processing related to information security, inclusion of liability 
limitations, establishing permitted used of anonymized data, 
and defining permitted uses of repurposed data.19 
I. AI-DRIVEN CYBERSECURITY SYSTEMS: A PRACTICAL 
AND TECHNICAL EXPLORATION 
Enthusiasm for AI technologies has perhaps never been 
greater.20 The tangible realizations and speculative promises of 
AI have prompted governments and industries to look towards 
AI as a transformational technology capable of disrupting nearly 
all industries.21 An area that has received significant attention 
in this regard is cybersecurity.22 The advent of cyberspace has 
fostered blended worlds of overlapping technologies, which are 
themselves vectors for disruption. For nation states, corporate 
entities, and private citizens alike, security in cyberspace is 
paramount to existing safely in an interconnected world.23 
However, adequate security in this domain remains elusive as a 
growing threat landscape and limited resources create more 
challenges than solutions.24 This has prompted those in the 
cybersecurity domain to focus on AI as a remedial measure.25 
Section A explores the utility of AI in the cybersecurity domain 
and discusses the critical role that AI and machine learning will 
                                                          
 19. Id. 
 20. See Despite Enthusiasm for AI Adoption, Governments are Experiencing 
Challenges, HELP NET SECURITY, Oct. 28, 2019, 
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/10/28/government-ai-adoption 
-challenges/ (noting that government leaders and senior information technology 
decision-makers in Finland, France, Germany, Norway, and U.K. are optimistic 
and enthusiastic about using AI in their operations). 
 21. See NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 3 (describing U.S. 
concerns surrounding AI and noting that “AI holds the potential to be a major 
driver of economic growth and social progress, if industry, civil society, 
government, and the public work together to support development of the 
technology with thoughtful attention to its potential and to managing its 
risks.”). 
 22. Id. at 36. 
 23. See id. (urging government and private entities to cooperate to apply AI 
to cybersecurity and ensure the security of AI systems.). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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likely play in the future of network defense as security and 
privacy move to the forefront of business considerations. Section 
B examines the current state of AI applied to cybersecurity 
platforms, as well as the outlook for achieving greater autonomy 
in these systems. Lastly, Section C provides a foundational 
exploration of the technical aspects surrounding autonomous 
network defense systems. As a lead into Part II, this exploration 
will highlight aspects of AI-driven network defense relevant to 
the respective privacy and automation provisions of the GDPR. 
A. THE RISE OF INTELLIGENT NETWORK DEFENSE SYSTEMS: 
ANTICIPATING AUTONOMOUS CYBERSECURITY 
The proliferation of the internet has fostered an 
interconnected world where malicious actors can transcend 
physical and geographical barriers to cause harm. From 
espionage to offensive cyber operations, intellectual property 
theft to compromises of private information, cyberspace has 
precipitated a new domain to pursue traditional forms of 
conflict. Cyberspace has been defined by the evolution of 
technology, but its novelty in relation to conventional conflict is 
born from its applicability as a new venue for opportunity and 
disruption.26 For governments, cyberspace is a domain void of 
geographical barriers; yet one which they are compelled to 
defend.27 For corporations, security in cyberspace has become a 
foundational business consideration in a time when data 
breaches can have insurmountable consequences. 
The cyber threat landscape has rapidly evolved as 
technology and data expand across interconnected domains of 
nation state activity, commerce, and public use.28 Cyberspace is 
inherently blurred by rapidly evolving technologies, a broad 
range of actors, and the absence of an institutional hierarchy. As 
such, the digital world has precipitated a paradigm of new 
vectors for opportunity and harm. Innate to the underlying 
advancements in technology and increased global connectivity is 
                                                          
 26. See NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 35 (discussing the 
international cooperation and governance implications of AI). 
 27. Id at 3. 
 28. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, THE COST OF MALICIOUS CYBER 
ACTIVITY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 4 (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/The-Cost-of-Malicious-Cyber-Activity-to-the-U.S. 
-Economy.pdf (explaining the landscape of threats posed by “malicious cyber 
activity”). 
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the amplified threat to information technology systems. This 
hand-in-hand relationship is the fundamental quagmire of 
society’s dependence on technology—advancements in 
information automation simultaneously offer ways to improve 
people’s lives through technological means while augmenting 
the avenues by which we can be harmed through our use of the 
same technology.29 Cybersecurity is no exception and world 
leaders, lawmakers, and corporate executives have taken notice. 
Nation states utilize the digitally connected world to pursue 
traditional forms of conflict in a new medium.30 Meanwhile, 
corporations are routinely faced with novel threats from state 
and non-state actors seeking to leverage cyberspace for criminal 
gain and other nefarious purposes. As many have noted, 
cybersecurity is now a “C-suite” issue that has the potential to 
disrupt business operations and undermine the integrity of an 
organization.31 To appreciate the cyber threat one must look no 
further than recent news headlines.32 Data breaches, theft of 
trade secrets, and targeted cyberattacks have in recent years 
plagued corporations and governments across the globe. 
Cyberattacks can disrupt critical infrastructure, undermine 
financial markets and institutions, and threaten national 
security.33 The ramifications of these threats extend well beyond 
a disruption of business operations to include liability, 
regulatory penalties, loss of strategic information, and 
reputational damage.34 Moreover, the externalities of 
                                                          
 29. E.g., NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 39 (“AI can be a major 
driver of economic growth and social progress . . . with thoughtful attention to 
its potential and to managing its risks.”). 
 30. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 28 at 3 (describing 
malicious cyber activity carried out by nation-states against other nation-
states). 
 31. See Greene, supra note 10 (describing the increased focus on cyber risk 
management by corporate executive boards). 
 32. See, e.g. Alyza Sebenius & William Turton, U.S. Officials Brace for 
Cyber-Attack Retaliation from Iran, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 3, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-03/u-s-officials-brace-for 
-cyber-attack-retaliation-from-iran (reporting on the potential for Iranian 
cyber-attacks in response to U.S airstrikes on Iran). 
 33. Nadine Wirkuttis & Hadas Klein, Artificial Intelligence in 
Cybersecurity, 1 CYBER, INTELLIGENCE, & SECURITY 103, 104 (2017) (explaining 
three primary motivations underlying cyber threats: “financial, political, or 
military reasons”). 
 34. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 28 at 33 (“The total cost 
of malicious cyber activity directed at U.S. entities is difficult to estimate 
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cyberattacks can have cascading effects on broader communities 
of users, business partners, industries, and governments. 
The scope of harm posed by malicious cyber activity is 
immense and pervasive across a spectrum of institutions. 
Moving forward, the problem is only likely to worsen with the 
rise of big data, the proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT), 
and the prominence of automation in nearly all aspects of 
society.35 The challenge for corporate and governmental 
organizations is keeping up with evolving threats when 
resources and talent are increasingly strained. From a workforce 
perspective, there is simply not enough talent to go around. 
According to the 2017 Global Information Security Workforce 
Study released by the Center for Cyber Safety and Education, 
there will be a cybersecurity workforce shortage of 1.8 million by 
2022.36 Meanwhile, companies are increasingly subject to 
regulatory fines and liabilities as governments pass data privacy 
and breach notification laws.37 Cybersecurity has no doubt 
moved to the forefront of business considerations as institutions 
increasingly see the need to be more vigilant in safeguarding 
data and responding to threats. However, acknowledging the 
problem is only part of finding a solution, and limited means in 
an expanding threat landscape are likely to challenge 
cybersecurity in the years to come.38 In an effort to confront the 
cybersecurity challenge, institutions and security experts are 
                                                          
because . . . many data breaches go undetected, and even when they are 
detected, they are mostly unreported, or the final cost is unknown.”). 
 35. See Remesh Ramachandran, How Artificial Intelligence Is Changing 
Cyber Security Landscape and Preventing Cyber Attacks, ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 
14, 2019), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/339509 (stating that the 
efficiency and low cost of the rise of AI can be used both for cybersecurity and 
for cost-effective attacks). 
 36. See (ISC)2, Comment to NIST RFI – Strengthening the Cybersecurity 
of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure: Workforce Development 
(2017) https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2017/08/02/isc2.pdf 
(describing the current metrics of the cybersecurity workforce and anticipated 
challenges). 
 37. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), all 
50 U.S. states have enacted data breach notification laws. See Security Breach 
Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (Sept. 9, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information 
-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx (providing a table of the 
corresponding breach notification statute for each state). 
 38. See Wirkuttis & Klein, supra note 33, at 115 (explaining that AI’s 
advances still cannot fully accommodate the rapidly changing cybersecurity 
environment). 
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turning towards AI technologies and machine learning processes 
to alter the economics of cybersecurity.39   
B. AN OVERVIEW OF AI, MACHINE LEARNING, AND 
CYBERSECURITY 
In the context of cybersecurity, AI technologies can 
encompass a spectrum of utility ranging from automated 
detection to adaptive, autonomous systems capable of sharing 
information and acting independently of human control to 
protect a network or information system. While the former exists 
in some of today’s cybersecurity systems, the latter is more akin 
to an ambition—feasible in the coming years only if AI 
technologies achieve greater autonomy.40 To appreciate AI in the 
context of cybersecurity, however, it is important to first 
understand AI technologies as a whole. AI can be broadly viewed 
as a computerized system that can rationally solve complex 
problems or act appropriately to achieve an objective.41 Across 
applications of AI, experts have more narrowly defined the scope 
of AI based on taxonomies that reflect the function, capabilities, 
or problem space of a system.42 For example, venture capitalist 
Frank Chen categorizes the problem space of AI into five general 
groups: “logical reasoning, knowledge representation, planning 
and navigation, natural language processing, and perception.”43 
                                                          
 39. Raghav Bharadwaj, Artificial Intelligence in Cybersecurity – Current 
Use-Cases and Capabilities, EMERJ (July 22, 2019), https://emerj.com/ai-sector-
overviews/artificial-intelligence-cybersecurity/ (surveying current and potential 
business uses for AI in cybersecurity). 
 40. See Bert Rankin, AI in Cybersecurity: What Is Hype and What Is Real?, 
LASTLINE (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.lastline.com/blog/ai-technology-in 
-cybersecurity-what-is-hype-and-what-is-real/ (discussing the current 
limitations and future expectations of AI as applied to the cybersecurity field). 
See also The Value of Artificial Intelligence in Cybersecurity, PONEMON INST. 
(July 2018) at 10, https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/EX0P6YPO (finding that 
human intervention is still required when dealing with alerts). 
 41. See NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3 at 6-7 (offering 
alternative definitions of AI concepts and suggesting a problem-solution 
taxonomy for defining AI). 
 42. See id. at 6 (citing STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH (2d ed. 2009)) (discussing AIs as “systems 
that think like humans . . . systems that act like humans . . . systems that think 
rationally . . . [and] systems that act rationally” and explaining the differences 
between each). 
 43. Id. at 7 (citing Frank Chen, AI, Deep Learning, and Machine Learning: 
A Primer, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ (June 10, 2016), 
http://a16z.com/2016/06/10/ai-deep-learning-machines). 
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AI is inherently difficult to define because the application of 
AI technologies often flows between routine data processing by 
algorithmic systems and more advanced AI processes that 
require intelligent computer operations. It is common for a 
problem to be initially viewed as requiring AI to be solved when 
the solution ultimately requires only routine data processing.44 
Further clarification can be found by looking at how AI is used. 
From self-driving vehicles to diagnosing disease, AI is a 
burgeoning tool that, year by year, takes hold in new industries 
and markets. Meanwhile, on a more intimate level, our daily 
interaction with AI-driven products like smart speakers and 
facial recognition tools are inconspicuously and rapidly altering 
the human relationship with technology. These forms of AI, 
commonly referred to as Narrow AI,45 have already proliferated 
across society and enhanced how we use technology for common 
tasks. Meanwhile, the future of AI technologies lies in General 
AI—systems capable of demonstrating intelligent behavior to 
process cognitive tasks.46 While Narrow AI enables machines to 
complete a defined task in a manner beyond that of which a 
human can do, General AI has the potential to surpass human 
performance in nearly every cognitive process.47 In the context 
of cybersecurity, a General AI system would be that which 
employs predictive and adaptive information security or 
network defense techniques to communicate between systems 
and act independent of human control. 
At its core, AI can be viewed as the pursuit of applications 
that can systemically produce intelligent behavior.48 However, 
                                                          
 44. Id. (“In some cases, opinion may shift, meaning that a problem is 
considered as requiring AI before it has been solved, but once a solution is well 
known it is considered routing data processing.”). 
 45. Narrow AI is “narrow” in that a new system must be developed for each 
new application. See id. at 7 n.12 (“Narrow AI is not a single technical approach, 
but rather a set of discrete problems whose solutions rely on a toolkit of AI 
methods along with some problem-specific algorithms.”). 
 46. Id. at 7 (“General AI . . . refers to a notional future AI system that 
exhibits apparently intelligent behavior at least as advanced as a person across 
the full range of cognitive tasks.”) (emphasis in original). 
 47. See Tegmark, supra note 3 (“While narrow AI may outperform humans 
at whatever its specific task is, like playing chess or solving equations, AGI 
would outperform humans at nearly every cognitive task.”). 
 48. See NAT. SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 7 (“Although the 
boundaries of AI can be uncertain and have tended to shift over time, what is 
important is that a core objective of AI research and applications over the years 
has been to automate or replicate intelligent behavior.”). 
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the breadth and application of AI is vast, and there are no 
universal definitions for AI and the subsets of AI-related 
technologies and processes.49 It is important to recognize how 
ambiguously defined AI impacts the development and 
proliferation of the technology. This is immediately apparent 
when looking at the short-term limitations and long-term 
prospects of AI in cybersecurity. Vendors are increasingly 
advertising AI-driven cybersecurity solutions capable of 
detecting threats and responding to intrusions even before they 
develop into a full breach.50 However, many experts believe that 
this advertising is misleading.51 While these systems do employ 
AI-based techniques to detect malware and recognize anomalous 
patterns, the systems still fall under the category of Narrow AI 
and likely fall short of touted expectations.52 This concept 
becomes more apparent when looking at the intrusion detection 
systems commonly used today. 
Intrusion detection systems monitor a network or system 
looking for malicious activity that violates a defined rule. They 
are typically either network or host-based;53 however, they can 
also be characterized by how they detect malicious activity. Such 
methods generally fall into two categories: signature-based 
detection that identifies defined sequences within strings of 
data,54 or anomaly-based detection that looks for patterns 
outside of defined baselines.55 Anomaly-based detection often 
relies on machine learning, a subset of AI that uses algorithms 
to statistically evaluate large amounts of data to repeatedly 
refine its decision-making process and outcomes.56 While these 
systems are more capable of “learning” and recognizing patterns 
                                                          
 49. See id. at 6–7. 
 50. See generally, Lily H. Newman, AI Can Help Cybersecurity – If It Can 
Fight Through the Hype, WIRED (Apr. 29, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/ai-machine-learning-cybersecurity/ (criticizing 
machine learning cybersecurity solutions that are advertised as “AI Driven”). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See, e.g., Christopher Day, Intrusion and Prevention Detection Systems, 
in COMPUTER AND INFORMATION SECURITY HANDBOOK 63–66 (2009) 
(discussing the advantages and disadvantages of host-based and network-based 
intrusion detection systems). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Wirkuttis & Klein, supra note 33, at 107 (describing the two main 
principles for intrusion detection prevention systems (IDPS)). 
 56. See generally Newman, supra note 50. 
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to keep up with evolving cyberattacks, they are still primarily 
detection systems that require human programming and 
control.57 In a sense, the application of machine learning 
techniques to network defense systems can be viewed as an 
extension of rules-based systems. This can be thought of as 
automated processes designed to make cybersecurity threat 
detection and mitigation efforts more efficient and effective 
while still requiring a degree of human control. Although they 
utilize advanced machine learning techniques, they are a far cry 
from General AI. 
Deep learning—using neural network models to mimic 
human thinking—is a subset of machine learning. Nidhi 
Chappel, the Director of Machine Learning at Intel, described 
this technique as “machines learning on their own without 
explicit programming.”58 She analogized this process to how a 
child learns societal norms by observing the world without 
having to be explicitly told the rules.59 For cybersecurity, deep 
learning is another step towards truly autonomous network 
defense and has already demonstrated some utility.60 For 
example, deep learning approaches have enhanced malware 
identification and have thereby reduced false positives and 
negatives.61 It is important to note, however, that even systems 
trained using deep learning are only preventive to an extent.62 
They are still primarily driven by a detect-and-respond model 
that is less conducive to an evolving threat landscape.63 Moving 
forward, experts believe that AI will have a significant impact 
                                                          
 57. See id. 
 58. Deb M. Landau, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning: How 
Computers Learn, IQ (Aug. 17, 2016) (quoting Nidhi Chappel). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Raffael Marty, AI in Cybersecurity: Where We Stand & Where We 
Need to Go, DARKREADING (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/ai-in-cybersecurity-where 
-we-stand-and-where-we-need-to-go/a/d-id/1330787 (“Today’s approaches in 
malware identification have greatly benefited from deep learning, which has 
helped drop false positive rates to very low numbers while reducing the false 
negative rates at the same time.”). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. (explaining that unsupervised machine learning is still not ideal 
for locating anomalies, and, while supervised machine learning has been more 
effective for malware, it lacks good data sets for most other areas, preventing 
the training of algorithms). 
 63. Id. 
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on cybersecurity.64 These technologies are expected to offer a 
more preventive solution that can classify cyber threats in real-
time and detect never-before-seen activity, such as zero-day 
exploits.65 Experts anticipate these systems will eventually be 
capable of taking action with little human input or even without 
intervention from a network operator.66 
The current state of autonomous cybersecurity systems is 
blurred by a fog of promises from cybersecurity vendors.67 Many 
companies advertise systems that use AI technologies capable of 
preventing attacks.68 However, experts have suggested that 
these guarantees are more marketing than technique.69 Many of 
the products still employ learning approaches that require 
human operators to tag data used to train algorithms. While 
security companies are deploying systems that employ machine 
learning approaches, fully autonomous network defense systems 
are still more of a dream than a reality.70 Embellished promises 
and a lack of understanding of how these systems can easily 
cloud the state of AI in the cybersecurity industry. 
Notwithstanding, the likelihood of greater autonomy in 
cybersecurity systems seems encouraging. Researchers continue 
to push the bounds of AI to reduce the blind spots associated 
                                                          
 64. See generally Game Changers: Artificial Intelligence Part III, Artificial 
Intelligence and Public Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Info. Tech. of 
the H. Oversight Comm., 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Ben Buchanan, 
Postdoctoral Fellow, Belfer Center Cybersecurity Project, Harvard University), 
Prepared Testimony and Statement for the Record of Ben Buchanan, 
Postdoctoral Fellow, Belfer Center Cybersecurity Project, Harvard University, 
House Oversight Committee, Subcommittee on IT (Apr. 6, 2018). 
 65. See generally Laurent Gil, The Debate Is Over: Artificial Intelligence Is 
the Future of Cybersecurity, THE CYBERSECURITY SOURCE (Mar. 22, 2018), 
https://www.scmagazine.com/home/opinions/blogs/executive-insight/the 
-debate-is-over-artificial-intelligence-is-the-future-for-cybersecurity/ 
(explaining why AI is the only viable option for future cybersecurity systems). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Newman, supra note 50 (“Machine learning’s biggest strength in 
security is training to understand what is ‘baseline’ or ‘normal’ for a system, 
and then flagging anything unusual for human review.”). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See generally id. 
 70. See Scott Finnie, AI in Cybersecurity: What Works and What Doesn’t, 
CSO ONLINE (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://www.csoonline.com/article/3295596/security/ai-in-cybersecurity-what-
works-and-what-doesnt.html (“Much of what we hear about artificial 
intelligence and machine learning in security products is steeped in marketing, 
making it hard to know what these tools actually do.”). 
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with traditional network defense systems. As AI technologies 
and deep learning techniques proliferate, it is likely that AI-
based systems will require less and less human interaction. 
In the cybersecurity domain, the capacity to detect and 
respond to intrusions is dependent on the ability to collect, 
process and analyze data. AI-based cybersecurity systems 
enhance this process through a combination of automation and 
advanced algorithms. The success of these systems is dependent 
on the availability of large quantities of quality data.71 
Traditionally, vast amounts of data have made it difficult for 
network defenders to distinguish relevant data and make 
connections across data sets. In contrast, machine learning 
thrives off data and offers significant advantages in this 
regard.72 More data allows AI-based cybersecurity systems to 
establish a baseline of normal network activity or system 
behavior. Using an anomaly detection approach, these systems 
can then better detect changes or abnormalities in the 
network.73 Alternatively, these systems can use large amounts 
of data to employ a misuse detection approach that identifies 
malicious activity by defining patterns of abnormal behavior in 
the network or system.74 
In its current state, AI-based cybersecurity systems still 
require some level of human intervention. While today’s systems 
make the threat detection process more efficient and empower 
security analysts to make connections in a dynamic threat 
environment, human decision-making is a requirement 
nonetheless.75 Notwithstanding, advancements in deep learning 
and artificial neural networks show promise in achieving greater 
autonomy in the cybersecurity domain. Beyond improvements in 
the underlying algorithms, progress in the field of AI-based 
cybersecurity will be dependent on the availability of data sets. 
As such, it is likely that data privacy will weigh heavily in the 
                                                          
 71. See Marty, supra note 60 (arguing that machine learning requires large 
amounts of training data to be practically employed as a cybersecurity solution). 
 72. See id. 
 73. See Wirkuttis & Klein, supra note 33, at 107 (describing the misuse 
detection approach and the anomaly detection approach associated with 
intrusion detection prevention systems). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 114 (noting that expert systems have only progressed to the point 
of assisting decision makers and do not substitute for them). 
2020] CYBERSECURITY, PRIVACY & AI 183 
 
development, proliferation, and overall utility of AI-based 
cybersecurity systems. 
C. A TECHNICAL PRIMER ON MACHINE LEARNING AND 
CYBERSECURITY: WHAT IT LOOKS LIKE, WHERE IT IS GOING, AND 
ITS RELATION TO DATA PRIVACY 
Cybersecurity is premised on identifying malicious activity 
within a host, system, or network.76 This inherently requires 
network defenders to differentiate between permissible activity 
and malicious behavior, a nuanced task that can prove 
challenging when malicious intent is rarely apparent.77 Often 
the distinguishing element is simply context.78 Whether it is 
downloading a malicious file or copying permitted software, 
network traffic often looks the same.79 Put another way, the only 
difference between permitted network activity and malicious 
behavior is often the context of data flow. Machine learning 
seeks to address this challenge by leveraging large amounts of 
data to establish a baseline (i.e. what is “normal”), distinguish 
anomalies, and attribute such deviations to malicious network 
behavior.80 There are two primary approaches to machine 
learning: supervised and unsupervised learning.81 Supervised 
machine learning relies on large sets of labeled data to train 
algorithms as to what is “good” or “bad.”82 This approach has 
demonstrated significant utility for combating malware and 
spam because of the availability of large sets of labeled 
samples.83 However, in scenarios where good data sets are 
limited, such as detecting network attacks, supervised machine 
learning would prove less useful because there is insufficient 
                                                          
 76. See generally Marty, supra note 60. 
 77. See id. (stating that the primary task of machine learning is to “find 
anomalies” and acknowledging the difficulties of this form of threat detection 
with limited training data). 
 78. Id. (explaining that context alleviates challenges in identifying 
anomalies with machine learning). 
 79. See id. (“For example, can you define what is normal behavior for your 
laptop day in, day out? Don’t forget to think of that new application you 
downloaded recently. How do you differentiate that from a download triggered 
by an attacker?”). 
 80. See id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. (“The two poster use cases [for success in machine learning] are 
malware identification and spam detection.”). 
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data to establish a baseline for anomaly detection.84 
Unsupervised learning is another approach used to train 
algorithms. This entails various techniques, such as 
dimensionality reduction, clustering, and association rule 
learning, designed to make data easier to analyze and 
understand.85 While these techniques are beyond the scope of 
this paper, they can best be thought of as ways to find or describe 
hidden structures in data.86 
Two principal considerations in the context of machine 
learning, cybersecurity, and data privacy are the types of data 
relevant to AI-based network defense systems and how that data 
is used. The first consideration can be broad and is often heavily 
dependent on the nature of the cyber threat in question. 
Examples of relevant data points are IP addresses, domain 
names, host names, port numbers, file names, registry data, 
commands, usernames, email addresses, and hashes. All of this 
information can be broadly classified as threat indicators. The 
second consideration, how data is used, also significantly 
depends on the nature of the cyber threat. For the purposes of 
this paper, how data is used is best viewed in the context of cyber 
threat intelligence and how it is leveraged to protect networks 
and systems. Cyber threat intelligence is threat data that has 
been collected, evaluated, and analyzed by experts using 
structured tradecraft.87 It is fueled by an intelligence cycle that 
leverages advanced toolsets and human expertise to identify and 
attribute cyber threats. 
A significant piece of this process is information sharing 
that leverages the collective knowledge, experience, and 
capabilities of whole communities to better understand cyber 
threats.88 There are sector-specific Information Sharing and 
                                                          
 84. Id. (describing limitations to supervised machine learning). 
 85. Id. (discussing different applications for unsupervised machine 
learning). 
 86. See id. 
 87. See Intel & Analysis Working Group, What Is Cyber Threat 
Intelligence?, CENTER FOR INTERNET SECURITY (n.d.), https:// 
www.cisecurity.org/blog/what-is-cyber-threat-intelligence/. (“Cyber threat 
intelligence is what cyber threat information becomes once it has been collected, 
evaluated in the context of its source and reliability, and analyzed through 
rigorous and structured tradecraft techniques by those with substantive 
expertise and access to all-source information.”). 
 88. See NIST, SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-150, GUIDE TO CYBER THREAT 
INFORMATION SHARING at iii (2016),  
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Analysis Centers (ISACs) and private entities within the United 
States and internationally that implement similar sharing 
programs.89 For example, the Financial Services Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center is the central resource for cyber 
and physical threat intelligence analysis and sharing amongst 
the global financial industry.90 In addition to specific indicators, 
ISACs often share tactics, techniques, and procedures, security 
alerts, threat intelligence reports, and tool configurations.91 
Such sharing no doubt enhances cybersecurity across the globe; 
however, it can be a double-edged sword when data privacy is 
taken into account.92 
A key challenge for sharing threat information is protecting 
against unauthorized disclosure of personal data.93 This has 
prompted ISACs and similar entities to employ detailed sharing 
policies and procedures to safeguard privacy in the digital 
world.94 Today, the sharing process is highlighted by extensive 
human control.95 Indicators are vetted and threat information is 
stripped of personal data before being disseminated to larger 
groups.96 However, this process will likely change as AI-driven 
systems increasingly replace human judgment to make 
determinations and share information. This paradigm may be 
especially challenging when considered in the context of the 
black box problem—the idea that an advanced system can 
produce a result without any evidence as to how it arrived at its 
                                                          
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/specialpublications/nist.sp.800-150.pdf (“By 
exchanging cyber threat information within a sharing community, 
organizations can leverage the collective knowledge, experience, and 
capabilities of that sharing community to gain more complete understanding of 
the threats the organization may face.”). 
 89. See, e.g., FINANCIAL SERVICES INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS 
CENTER (FSISAC), https://www.fsisac.com/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2020). 
 90. See generally id. 
 91. See NIST 800-150, supra note 88, at ii (“Cyber threat information 
includes indicators of compromise; tactics, techniques, and procedures used by 
threat actors; suggested actions to detect, contain, or prevent attacks; and the 
findings from the analyses of incidents.”). 
 92. See id. at 4–5 (highlighting concerns relating to safeguarding personal 
information and trade secrets when exchanging information on cyber threats). 
 93. See id. at 4 (listing the “[d]isclosure of sensitive information, such 
as . . . personally identifiable information” as one of the challenges of 
information sharing). 
 94. See id. (providing guidelines for establishing and participating in 
sharing relationships). 
 95. See, e.g., id. (outlining regulations for information sharing). 
 96. See id. at 11. 
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decision.97 The effectiveness of tomorrow’s cybersecurity 
systems could very well depend on the availability and sharing 
of information that may directly or indirectly involve personal 
data. Moving forward, this could pose significant challenges for 
engineers and lawmakers as society seeks to balance 
cybersecurity needs and data privacy concerns. 
II. THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION: 
AUTONOMOUS CYBERSECURITY AND DATA PRIVACY 
The proliferation of technologies across nearly all domains 
is altering the foundation of civilization. Never before in the 
history of humankind have societies been more connected, as 
emerging technologies foster unparalleled ways to for us to 
communicate our identity to the world—intentionally or 
unintentionally. In the wake of society’s technological growth, 
we are now faced with the challenges of our technological 
supremacy, and data privacy is taking center stage.98 Society 
continues to immerse itself in computerized machinery 
prompting each individual to leave a digital footprint99 that is 
often more revealing of a person’s being than any other form of 
communication. While there are benefits and conveniences to 
projecting one’s digital self to the world, it can also be fraught 
with uncertainty, lack of control, and abusive practices that 
threaten the very utility of the underlying technologies.100 This 
has prompted lawmakers to direct significant attention to data 
privacy, and Europe has taken the lead. 
                                                          
 97. See Brandon Buckner, How Can We Trust Decisions Made by AI?, 
Leidos: Insights (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.leidos.com/insights/how-can-we 
-trust-decisions-made-ai (stating that decisions made by AI and machine 
learning techniques are often made in a “black box” and that tracing a point 
back to its origin is not yet a part of AI and machine learning). 
 98. See, e.g., Paul Smits, Legal Specialist: New Technology Forces Update 
of Data Privacy Laws, INNOVATION ORIGINS (Feb. 9, 2020), 
https://innovationorigins.com/legal-specialist-new-technology-forces-update-of-
data-privacy-laws/ (interviewing legal privacy expert, Jeroen Terstegge, who 
believes the emergence of new technologies prompts an update in the General 
Data Protection Regulation). 
 99. See Digital Footprint, TECHTERMS, https:// 
techterms.com/definition/digital_footprint (last visited Feb. 9, 2020) (defining 
“digital footprint” as “a trail of data you create while using the Internet”). 
 100. See, e.g., id. (“[O]nce digital data has been shared online, there is no 
guarantee you will ever be able to remove it from the Internet.”). 
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Part II of this paper explores the GDPR101 as it relates to AI-
based network defense systems. It offers two key findings: first, 
compliance under the GDPR may be challenging but still 
possible for today’s AI-based cybersecurity systems, and second, 
absent a technological solution, it will become increasingly 
difficult for these systems to maintain GDPR compliance as the 
underlying AI technologies achieve greater autonomy. Section A 
examines how the GDPR applies to AI and network defense and 
discusses the compliance challenges posed by this regulation. 
Section B examines the larger challenges of GDPR compliance 
associated with training algorithms and information sharing. 
Section C looks at the future of AI-based network defense and 
how these challenges will be compounded as AI-based network 
defense systems move towards greater autonomy and may be 
less capable of protecting personal data. Lastly, Section D 
highlights the growing consensus within the US for a national 
data privacy law and identifies key features that may minimize 
data privacy issues in cybersecurity and promote the overall 
development of autonomous network defense systems. 
A. THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION APPLIED TO 
AI-BASED NETWORK DEFENSE: LEGAL QUESTIONS AND 
CHALLENGES 
In 2016, the European Union (EU) Parliament passed the 
most significant data privacy regulation in decades. The GDPR, 
which took effect on May 25, 2018, provides EU citizens with 
extensive data privacy and protection rights that are designed 
to protect102 European citizens and harmonize data privacy laws 
across Europe.103 However, the regulation extends beyond the 
EU to reach European citizens worldwide and businesses 
outside of Europe that handle the personal data of EU 
citizens.104 On its face, the GDPR does not seem to be a 
regulation that would govern cybersecurity and network 
defense. Rather, data privacy suggests protecting personal data 
                                                          
 101. See generally, GDPR. 
 102. See GDPR, pmbl. (1) (declaring protection of personal data a 
fundamental right). 
 103. See David Bender, GDPR Harmonization: Reality or Myth?, IAPP (June 
7, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/gdpr-harmonization-reality-or-myth/. 
 104. See generally Chakravorti, supra note 15 (explaining that the global 
nature of information technology has the effect of imposing Europe’s GDPR 
Rules on the rest of the world). 
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used for things like social media or financial transactions. But if 
one looks deeper, the connection between personal data and 
cybersecurity is more apparent. In the context of AI-based 
network defense, the association with data processing is 
primarily derived from two separate components of the 
automated threat intelligence life cycle: personal data used to 
train a network defense algorithm and personal data used in the 
cyber threat intelligence sharing process.105 
1. The GDPR: Scope 
The GDPR applies to the “processing of personal data” by a 
“controller” or “processor” regardless of whether the processing 
takes place in the EU.106 The GDPR also applies to the 
processing of the personal data, of data subjects who are in the 
EU, by a “controller” or “processor” outside of the EU, when the 
processing relates to the offering of goods or services to EU 
citizens or the monitoring of EU citizens’ behavior that takes 
place in the EU.107 To fully unpack the scope of the GDPR and 
understand the extent of this regulation, one must look at how 
the regulation defines “personal data” and “processing,” as these 
terms collectively expand the material scope of the GDPR:108 
Personal Data means any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural 
person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular 
by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, 
location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to 
the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity of that natural person;109 
Processing means any operation or set of operations which is 
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not 
by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, 
structuring, storage, adaption, or alteration, retrieval, consultation, 
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making 
                                                          
 105. See supra Section I part C (discussing the ways that A.I. uses data in 
network defense). 
 106. GDPR, art. 3(1). 
 107. Id. at art. 3(2)(a)–(b). 
 108. Matthew Humerick, Taking AI Personally: How the E.U. Must Learn to 
Balance the Interests of Personal Data Privacy & Artificial Intelligence, 34 
SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 393, 402 (2018) (suggesting that definitions of 
“personal data” and “processing” serve to expand the material scope of the 
GDPR). 
 109. GDPR, art. 4(1). 
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available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction 
. . . .110 
AI-based network defense systems primarily fall within the 
scope of the GDPR through either the use of personal data to 
train algorithms or when personal data is used in the cyber 
threat intelligence sharing process. Both scenarios raise 
questions of whether an entity can be considered a “controller” 
or “processor,” and whether certain indicators are considered 
personal data. As noted above, a “controller” is an entity that 
determines the purposes and means of the processing of data,111 
and a “processor” is an entity that processes personal data on 
behalf of a controller.112 In network defense and the cyber threat 
information life cycle, this encompasses any entity that collects 
and stores data, shares information, or uses data for machine 
learning. This could include developers, security vendors, 
ISACs, or entities that have employed a particular AI-based 
network defense system because these entities are all involved 
in operations performed on personal data. In many cases an 
entity could be considered both a “controller” and a “processor” 
depending on the operational data role.113 
The next question is whether the relevant data is even 
considered personal data. As discussed above, network defense 
is fueled by known indicators, and these indicators often include 
personal data. Some indicators, such as email addresses, 
usernames, or payment transactions, are more obviously 
associated with personal data.114 These types of indicators can 
be used, directly or indirectly, to identify a natural person. In 
other circumstances, whether an indicator constitutes personal 
data is less apparent and often depends on how it is used. One 
of the most common cyber threat indicators is an internet 
protocol (IP) address, and European courts have found that IP 
addresses are protected personal data because they allow users 
                                                          
 110. Id. at art. 4(2). 
 111. Id. at art. 4(7). 
 112. Id. at art. 4(8). 
 113. For example, a cybersecurity vendor could be considered a controller 
when it is processing data it collects and aggregates from various sources but 
also be considered a processor when it is only processing data on behalf of a 
particular client. 
 114. See, e.g., What Is Personal Data?, EU GDPR COMPLIANT (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2020) (listing full names, email addresses, and credit card numbers as 
examples of classical personal data), https://eugdprcompliant.com/personal 
-data/. 
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to be precisely identified.115 Even dynamic IP addresses, those 
which are temporarily assigned to a computing device, can be 
considered personal data when a controller has legal means to 
identify a data subject in conjunction with additional data that 
may be available.116 Under this principle, indicators could 
individually fall out of the scope of personal data. However, 
when means exist to augment data with other information to 
identify a data subject, the initial indicator could then be viewed 
as personal data. For example, a user’s search queries may only 
become personal data when a processor has access to IP records 
associated with the data subject that could then identify the 
natural person.117 
2. The GDPR: Key Features and Principles 
The GDPR consists of ninety-nine articles that collectively 
aim to regulate data processing and provide a uniform approach 
to data privacy.118 At its core, however, are specific principles set 
forth in Article 5.119 These key principles relating to the 
processing of personal data include lawfulness, fairness, and 
transparency; purpose limitation; data minimization; accuracy; 
storage limitation; integrity and confidentiality; and 
accountability.120 For those developing or using AI systems that 
utilize data from EU citizens, the GDPR can be an unavoidable 
force. In the age of big data and automation, the extraterritorial 
nature of the regulation can easily bring non-EU corporations 
within EU jurisdiction.121 Moreover, subjected entities can face 
administrative fines up to 20,000,000 EUR or up to four percent 
of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial 
                                                          
 115. See Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs, 
Compositeurs et Èditeurs, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, para. 26. (describing IP 
addresses as personal data). 
 116. See Case C-582/14, Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:779, para. 49 (holding that dynamic IP addresses are personal 
data within the meaning of former GDPR Article 2(a) under such 
circumstances). 
 117. See, e.g., id. (holding that a dynamic IP address can constitute personal 
data if an online services provider possesses the ability to identify the subject 
using the IP address in conjunction with other information). 
 118. See generally GDPR. 
 119. See GDPR, art. 5(1)(a)–(f). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See GDPR, art. 3 (establishing the extraterritorial scope of the GDPR). 
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year.122 The collective utility of the GDPR is up for debate. On 
one hand, it can be argued that the law is about protecting 
citizens by setting forth requirements and standards for data 
processing and information sharing.123 On the other, the GDPR 
can be viewed as a regulation with geopolitical intentions meant 
to strengthen Europe’s political power in the digital age.124 
Regardless of its purpose, the GDPR cannot be ignored, and 
there are several key provisions relevant to AI, cybersecurity, 
and information sharing. These include provisions related to the 
right to consent, the right to be forgotten, the right to an 
explanation, and the right to data portability. 
 A key feature of the GDPR is consent. Article 4(1) requires 
that consent be “freely given, specific, informed, and 
unambiguous.”125 Furthermore, the GDPR adopts an opt-in 
approach to consent that requires controllers to be able to 
demonstrate that the data subject has consented,126 and such 
consent can be withdrawn at any time.127 Data subjects can also 
restrict processing of personal data under certain 
circumstances.128 These include instances where a data subject 
contests the accuracy of personal data, the data subject believes 
the processing is unlawful but data erasure is not a suitable 
remedy, the controller no longer needs the personal data but 
must maintain it for legal claims of the data subject, or when the 
data subject has objected to processing based on legitimate 
grounds.129 For machine learning, these consent requirements 
                                                          
 122. GDPR, art. 83. 
 123. See GDPR, art. 1(1) (“This Regulation lays down rules relating to the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and 
rules relating to the free movement of personal data.”). 
 124. See Roslyn Layton & Julian Mclendon, The GDPR: What It Really Does 
and How the U.S. Can Chart a Better Course, 19 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 234, 
236 (2018) (suggesting that the primary goals of the GDPR are geopolitical, 
including “(1) solidifying legitimacy for Brussels during a period of skepticism 
among voters, and (2) strengthening European political power against the real 
or perceived threat of American digital prowess”). 
 125. GDPR, art. 4(11). 
 126. See GDPR, art. 7(1) (“Where processing is based on consent, the 
controller shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented to 
processing of his or her personal data.”). 
 127. See GDPR, art. 7(3) (“The data subject shall have the right to withdraw 
his or her consent at any time.”). 
 128. See GDPR, art. 18 (“The data subject shall have the right to obtain from 
the controller restriction of processing where one of the following applies . . . .”). 
 129. See id. 
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can prove challenging because it can limit the amount of data 
initially available and can impact the training model when data 
is subsequently removed.130 Prior learning may be valid, but 
derivative learning processes could risk GDPR 
noncompliance.131 Moving forward, these technical realities are 
likely to challenge engineers and legal experts seeking to 
promote compliant processes. 
Another key feature of the GDPR relates to erasing data—
the “right to be forgotten.”132 Under Article 17, controllers are 
obligated to erase all personal data under certain conditions.133 
Instances that warrant erasure of data include when the data is 
no longer necessary in relation to the purpose for which it was 
collected and when consent has been withdrawn.134 Similar to 
the consent issue, this can create significant challenges for AI. 
The utility of algorithms trained on machine learning processes 
stems from the training data.135 If data is subsequently removed, 
this can disrupt the algorithm’s future behavior and create 
inaccurate or unreliable results.136 Although companies could 
train algorithms on updated datasets, this may create additional 
risk and liabilities given the volatility and uncertainty if 
significant portions of training data can be so easily removed.137 
In the context of cybersecurity, this could prove disastrous. For 
example, if a large dataset of IP addresses was removed from a 
training model, then the baseline for the network defense system 
may be altered and no longer be reliable in detecting 
anomalies.138 Also, in some instances the technical realities of 
isolating and deleting data may make compliance overly 
burdensome. Some commentators have even suggested that the 
                                                          
 130. See Humerick, supra note 108, at 406 (“Both the need for consent and 
the right [to] withdraw consent threaten the development of AI because it could 
limit the amount of data available to learn from.”). 
 131. See id. (suggesting that when consent to use data is withdrawn “further 
processing of and learning from these specific data points would constitute a 
violation of the GDPR”). 
 132. GDPR, art. 17. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Humerick, supra note 108, at 408 (noting this impact that data 
erasure may have on the accuracy and reliability of an AI system). 
 136. See id. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See supra Part I Section B (discussing how anomaly detection requires 
processing of sufficient data sets). 
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technical requirements of data deletion could make compliance 
nearly impossible.139 Companies that are unable to isolate 
indicators that fall under the GDPR would risk noncompliance 
by continuing to operate their systems. 
Another prominent component of the GDPR as it relates to 
AI is the right to an explanation. Article 22 governs automated 
individual decision-making,140 which is often a key feature of AI 
systems.141 This article provides data subjects with the right to 
not be subject to decisions based solely on automated processing, 
including profiling, that produce a legal effect concerning the 
data subject.142 While there are stated exceptions, such as public 
interest or performance of a contract,143 uncertainty as to what 
meets an exception should warrant reservations for those 
looking to maintain compliance.144 Furthermore, the automated 
processing provisions require that any subject decisions be 
explainable.145 This can prove challenging, especially in the 
context of unsupervised learning, when engineers cannot trace 
the learning process or understand why the system made its 
                                                          
 139. See generally Edward F. Villaronga, Peter Kieseberg, & Tiffany Li, 
Humans Forget, Machines Remember: Artificial Intelligence and the Right to Be 
Forgotten, 34 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV., 304 (2018) (discussing the difficulties 
that arise in trying to erase data). 
 140. See GDPR, art. 22 (providing provisions relating to “[a]utomated 
individual decision-making, including profiling”). 
 141. See Falchetta, supra note 5 (explaining that AI applications are used to 
“automatically sort, score, categorize, assess and rank people”). 
 142. See GDPR, art. 22(1) (“The data subject shall have the right not to be 
subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, 
which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly 
affects him or her.”). 
 143. See id. at art. 22(2), 46 (providing exceptions for when data subjects 
may be able to be subject to a decision based solely on automatic processing that 
produce a legal effect). 
 144. See Eduardo Ustaran & Victoria Hordern, Automated Decision-Making 
Under the GDPR—A Right for Individuals or a Prohibition for Controllers, 
HOGAN LOVELLS: CHRONICLE OF DATA PROTECTION (Oct. 20, 2017), 
https://www.hldataprotection.com/2017/10/articles/international-eu 
-privacy/automated-decision-making-under-the-gdpr-a-right-for-individuals-
or-a-prohibition-for-controllers/ (discussing the “considerable uncertainty” with 
respect to Article 22 of the GDPR). 
 145. See GDPR, art. 22(3) (“[T]he data controller shall implement suitable 
measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights . . . at least the right to obtain 
human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of 
view and to contest the decision.”). 
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decision.146 As noted earlier, this is the black box problem.147 In 
the context of cybersecurity and information sharing, this can be 
a significant challenge when threat information is derived from 
protected information and automatically shared with another 
system or entity. 
On its face, GDPR compliance for automated processing is 
more akin to automated decisions that are closely aligned with 
the rights of a natural person, such as access to health care or 
criminal sentencing. However, automated decision processing 
exists in the cyber world as well and can have significant 
ramifications for users. This is especially true when 
participation in society increasingly requires access to 
information and the interconnected global domain. Imagine an 
individual whose login credentials are revoked after an 
automated system made a determination that revocation was 
necessary to protect the network.148 As AI moves towards 
greater autonomy and requires less human intervention, this is 
a scenario that may become more likely.149 In this instance, it is 
possible that network administrators would not be able to 
explain why the system revoked access.150 Although loss of 
access may not always be significant, the overarching issue is 
likely to warrant concern for companies seeking to promote 
compliant technology.151 
A final prominent feature of the GDPR that is relevant to AI 
is the right to data portability. Under Article 20, a data subject 
has a right to receive personal data concerning him or her and 
to transfer personal data from one controller to another.152 This 
creates some of the same issues posed by to the rights to consent 
                                                          
 146. See Buckner, supra note 97. 
 147. Supra Part I, Section C. 
 148. See, e.g., Lee Painter, Could AI Improve Identity Management and 
Security, CATAPULT DIGITAL (May 25, 2017), 
https://www.digicatapult.org.uk/news-and-views/blog/could-ai-improve 
-identity-management-and-security/ (describing the use of AI to determine if a 
user should be able to access a network). 
 149. See generally Buckner, supra note 97. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See GDPR, art. 22(2), at 46 (indicating that the automated decisions 
must be explicable). 
 152. GDPR, art. 20(1), at 45 (“[T]he data subject shall have the right to 
receive the personal data concerning him or her . . . in a structured, commonly 
used and machine-readable format . . . .”). 
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and erasure,153 but it also creates practical challenges for the 
cybersecurity industry. The utility of AI-based network defense 
systems is derived from the underlying data sets and 
algorithms.154 In most cases, users of these systems will have 
consented to use of their information.155 In the event of a breach, 
users may lose faith in a system and seek to take their business 
elsewhere. Like other areas of the GDPR, this can create both 
technical and legal problems that hinder the continued 
development and implementation of AI-based network defense 
systems. Moving forward, these challenges are only likely to be 
compounded as AI technologies move towards greater autonomy. 
B. TRAINING AI-BASED NETWORK DEFENSE SYSTEMS AND 
AUTOMATED INFORMATION SHARING: TODAY’S COMPLIANCE AND 
TOMORROW’S OUTLOOK 
The GDPR aims to protect consumers by regulating the 
processing of personal data.156 As described above, the 
development and use of AI-based network defense systems 
cannot escape the breadth of this regulation.157 On the front end, 
the development of these systems requires data to foster the 
machine learning process.158 Systems need personal data such 
as usernames, IP addresses, and other cyber threat indicators to 
train systems on normal behavior and empower systems to 
identify malicious activity.159 Once these systems are in place, 
                                                          
 153. See Humerick, supra note 108, at 409 (“[T]he right to portability poses 
similar problems to those inherent in the rights to consent and erasure.”). 
 154. See Buckner, supra note 97 (“If an AI system is well constituted and 
trained, has algorithms for prediction evaluation, and demonstrably produces 
reasonably high quality, true positive results, then that model may be suited 
for its purpose.”). 
 155. See Cybersecurity, AI, and Machine Learning: The Connection to GDPR, 
TREND MIRCO (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.trendmicro.com/ 
vinfo/pl/security/news/security-technology/cybersecurity-ai-and-machine-
learning-the-connection-to-gdpr (“Under GDPR, cybersecurity companies are 
mandated to obtain explicit consent and explain to customers how their data 
will be processed by security engines that use AI technology.”). 
 156. See GDPR, art. 1(1). 
 157. Supra Part II, Section A. 
 158. See, e.g., Artificial Intelligence for a Smarter Kind of Cybersecurity, 
IBM, https://www.ibm.com/security/artificial-intelligence (last visited Feb. 9, 
2020) (indicating that AI is trained by “consuming billions of data artifacts”). 
 159. Cf. Nathan McKinley, The Promise and Challenges of AI and Machine 
Learning for Cybersecurity, COP MAGAZINE (Nov. 28, 2019), 
https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/the-promise-and-challenges-of-
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they still require continuous data to learn in a dynamic threat 
environment.160 Moreover, the success of these systems moving 
forward will be heavily dependent on the ability to act at cyber 
speed.161 This can only be achieved when networks and systems 
are constantly sharing information, and AI will likely be a 
solution to this end.162 While this may be an ideal scenario for 
cybersecurity, it also brings network defense further within the 
scope of the GDPR.163 This section examines the larger 
challenges of GDPR compliance associated with training 
algorithms and information sharing. This leads into a broader 
discussion in Section C regarding the dichotomy of autonomous 
network defense and the challenges of cybersecurity as these 
systems become more automated and capable of autonomous 
action. 
1. Training AI-Based Network Defense Systems 
Good data drives good systems. Generally, AI systems that 
train using machine learning processes require large quantities 
of good data to produce successful results, and network defense 
is no different. As discussed in Part I, AI-based network defense 
is primarily driven by machine learning approaches that enable 
intrusion detection through signature and anomaly-based 
techniques.164 The breadth of relevant data can be vast. Network 
activity, such as routing information and user activity, allows an 
AI system to characterize network traffic and establish a more 
effective baseline that can be used to identify potentially 
                                                          
ai-and-machine-learning-for-cybersecurity/ (explaining that “without relevant 
datasets, you just cannot evaluate the security risks and threats at all”). 
 160. See id.  
 161. See id. (“Timely detection of the security threat or dangerous malware 
is the key to gain a competitive and proactive lead in providing security 
safeguards.”). 
 162. See, e.g., Derek Manky, AI and Machine Learning Will Have Significant 
Impact on Cyber Security Strategies, INFO. MGMT. (Jan. 9, 2020, 3:30 AM), 
https://www.information-management.com/opinion/ai-and-machine-learning 
-will-have-significant-impact-on-cybersecurity-strategies (proposing that 
future AI cybersecurity systems for will require vastly more sophisticated 
information-sharing capabilities). 
 163. See Cybersecurity, AI, and Machine Learning: The Connection to 
GDPR, supra note 155 (indicating that cybersecurity companies will need to 
implement additional measures around collecting and processing personal data 
to meet compliance requirements of the GDPR). 
 164. See Supra Part I. 
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malicious deviations.165 Similarly, large quantities of malware 
samples and other cyber threat intelligence information enables 
these systems to identify external threats in a dynamic threat 
environment.166 This collectively promotes a more effective 
system capable of identifying and combatting malicious cyber 
activity. 
As discussed in Section A, the GDPR places significant 
restrictions on how data is collected and used.167 In a sense, it 
can be thought of as an availability problem. Will the GDPR 
impose enough restrictions on the availability of good data to the 
point where the development and implementation of these 
systems may be unjustly stunted?168 At a minimum, this will 
require entities that develop or implement AI-based 
cybersecurity solutions to rethink approaches to collecting and 
securing data. Like other areas of technology, this can prove 
challenging when there is a gap in knowledge between 
technology and the law.169 Moreover, transparency issues 
associated with AI, such as the black box problem, may make 
this an insurmountable task in some instances.170 It is not to say 
that the requirements of the GDPR cannot be overcome, but it 
will likely require extensive resources to maintain compliance. 
From consent procedures to technical safeguards, developers 
and users of AI-based network defense systems will be required 
to reevaluate procedures and practices to comply with the data 
                                                          
 165. See Mustafa Rassiwala, Network Traffic Analytics—Do We Need One 
More Network Security Category?, LASTLINE (Oct. 25, 2018), 
https://www.lastline.com/blog/network-traffic-analytics-do-we-need-one-more 
-network-security-category/ (explaining AI applications in the field of network 
traffic analytics). 
 166. See Darek Manky, Threat Intelligence Lies at the Core of All Machine 
Learning and AI, FORTINET (Oct. 8, 2019), 
https://www.fortinet.com/blog/industry-trends/threat-intelligence-at-the-core 
-ai-machine-learning.html (discussing the need for good threat intelligence in 
order to detect today’s cybersecurity threats). 
 167. See supra Part II, Section A. 
 168. See Ahmed Baladi, Can GDPR Hinder AI Made in Europe, 
CYBERSECURITY L. REP. (July 10, 2019) https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp 
-content/uploads/2019/07/Baladi-Can-GDPR-Hinder-AI-Made-in-Europe-
Cybersecurity-Law-Report-10-07-19.pdf. 
 169. See, e.g., Gijs Leenders, The Regulation of Artificial Intelligence—A 
Case Study of the Partnership on AI, MEDIUM (Apr. 13, 2019), 
https://becominghuman.ai/the-regulation-of-artificial-intelligence-a-case-
study-of-the-partnership-on-ai-c1c22526c19f (arguing that regulators and the 
law tend to lag behind technology and innovation). 
 170. See supra Part I, Section C. 
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collection, consent, automation, and explanation requirements 
of the GDPR.171 In practice, only time will tell how significant 
the impact of the GDPR on the development of network defense 
systems that use AI technologies may be. Notwithstanding, 
there are some foreseeable consequences in this regard. 
First, it is likely that the GDPR will favor larger entities 
that have the resources to navigate compliance and employ 
cutting-edge technologies. From legal expertise to the use of 
advanced systems, large companies will be in the best position 
to implement safeguards to ensure compliance. Second, smaller 
companies may be most affected by this regulation in terms of 
developing AI-based solutions to network security. Innovation in 
this domain often comes from niche companies that develop 
narrow cybersecurity applications. It will become increasingly 
hard for these developers to independently find good data sets 
and to apply appropriate methods for compliance. Lastly, this 
could have a collective impact on the network defense market. 
The cybersecurity industry is increasingly turning to AI-based 
solutions. However, additional restrictions could shift the 
economic utility of advanced systems as research and 
development becomes more costly. The restrictions could also 
cause those entities with less resources to defer the use of AI-
based cybersecurity solutions. 
Despite these foreseeable consequences, it is important to 
note that regulation is not a zero-sum game. The GDPR will 
likely have some impact on the development and proliferation of 
AI-based cybersecurity systems; however, it is also unlikely that 
it will completely inhibit research and development in this field. 
In some respects, the GDPR may enhance autonomous 
cybersecurity. The GDPR is a data protection and data 
governance regulation.172 No matter where one stands on the 
spectrum of its utility, there is likely value in the GDPR as a tool 
to promote awareness of cybersecurity issues. While there may 
be other avenues to promote awareness, the GDPR has 
nonetheless forced issues surrounding privacy and security to 
the forefront of business considerations. At the heart of data 
                                                          
 171. See Cybersecurity, AI, and Machine Learning: The Connection to GDPR, 
supra note 155 (proposing that the tech industry, including cybersecurity 
companies implementing AI, will need to “retool” products and services to adapt 
to the GDPR era). 
 172. See Layton & Mclendon, supra note 124, at 235 (suggesting that the 
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protection is the use of technical systems and such heightened 
awareness could promote investment in data security systems. 
As in many areas of law and technology, the only certainty is 
often uncertainty and only time will tell how significant of an 
impact the GDPR has on the development of AI and 
cybersecurity. 
2. Automated Information Sharing 
Often, the value of information is limited by the extent to 
which it can be shared. A known cyber threat indicator may be 
useful to the entity that has it, but its value can quickly diminish 
when other systems or entities are in the dark. As discussed in 
Part I, information sharing of indicators and cyber threat 
intelligence is a significant component of network defense. This 
sharing can take many forms. Network defense systems can 
automatically distribute information across systems and 
networks, just as ISACs and other cyber threat sharing entities 
can share a spectrum of relevant threat information. The GDPR, 
in the interest of data protection, prescribes rules for 
information sharing surrounding consent, explanation 
requirements, and automated processes. However, it does not 
fully hinder the exchange of information. In fact, portions of the 
GDPR encourage sharing information related to network and 
information security.173 
Recital 49 of the GDPR notes that data controllers have a 
legitimate interest in the “processing of personal data to the 
extent strictly necessary and proportionate for the purpose of 
ensuring network and information security.”174 This recital 
specifically identifies computer emergency response teams 
(CERTs) and computer security incident response teams 
(CSIRTs), as well as other public authorities and providers of 
security technologies and services that would be considered data 
controllers. Essentially, this encourages authorized information 
sharing entities to share information that includes personal data 
when they have a legitimate interest and when doing so is 
necessary and proportionate to ensure network and information 
                                                          
 173. See Information Sharing and Cooperation Enabled by the GDPR, MISP 
(Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.misp-project.org/compliance/gdpr 
/information_sharing_and_cooperation_gdpr.html (“Recital 49 of the GDPR 
confirms that CSIRTs [computer security incident response teams] are 
encouraged to share information . . . .”). 
 174. GDPR, Recital 49. 
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security.175 Although this is a recital, and not an enforceable 
regulation, it suggests that the GDPR is not meant to inhibit 
cyber threat information sharing.176 This concept is supported 
by Article 32, which notes that controllers and processors “shall 
implement appropriate technical and organizational measures 
to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk . . . .”177 In 
the cybersecurity domain, information sharing is critical to 
protecting data and is therefore likely to be considered an 
essential measure to lowering risk.178 
Although sharing of information is permitted, it is still 
restricted by the GDPR. As noted, processing of data must be 
necessary and proportional for the purpose of network and 
information security. This most certainly creates some legal 
uncertainty. What is necessary and proportionate for an ISAC 
may be different for other parties in the cyber threat community, 
such as network defense system vendors. Further, it raises 
questions as to what is necessary and proportional, how this 
determination is made, and by whom. The first place to look at 
what could be necessary and proportional is the GDPR itself; in 
particular, the principles set forth in Article 5 (lawfulness, 
fairness, and transparency; purpose limitation; data 
minimization; accuracy; storage limitation; and integrity and 
confidentiality).179 Article 6(1)(e) also provides some guidance in 
this regard.180 It notes that “processing shall be lawful only if 
and to the extent that . . . [it] is necessary for the performance of 
a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of 
                                                          
 175. Information Sharing and Cooperation Enabled by the GDPR, supra 
note 173. 
 176. Id. 
 177. GDPR, art. 32. 
 178. Information Sharing and Cooperation Enabled by the GDPR, supra 
note 173 (“Information has to be perceived as [an] essential security measure to 
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 179. GDPR, art. 5; see also Information Sharing and Cooperation Enabled 
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official authority vested in the controller.”181 This is in no way 
definitive, as there remains ambiguity in what may be in the 
public interest and who may exercise official authority. 
However, it supports the idea that the GDPR was in no way 
meant to fully inhibit information sharing; rather, it seeks to 
regulate how it may be done. 
Similar to the development of AI-based cybersecurity 
systems, only time will tell how significant the impact of the 
GDPR may be on cyber threat information sharing. Increased 
regulation will warrant a greater investment in technologies and 
expertise to ensure compliance. However, it is in no way a 
foregone conclusion that this would materially alter the course 
of AI in the cybersecurity domain. A key consideration at this 
point, is how information is actually shared. As noted in Part I, 
network defense systems that are advertised as AI-driven still 
require a significant level of human control. This means there 
are analysts behind information sharing decisions who can strip 
shareable data of personal data in the interest of compliance. 
Although these processes are becoming more automated, there 
is human control nonetheless. Moving forward, the demands of 
an increased and dynamic threat landscape will require faster 
decision-making and more automation. As AI-based 
cybersecurity systems shift towards greater autonomy, they will 
be more capable of meeting these demands but may also create 
more questions for compliance. 
C. THE AUTONOMY PROBLEM: WHEN DOES AI BREAK THE 
MOLD? 
Regardless of the domain, a common question for legal 
scholars examining AI is whether AI will break the mold. Put 
differently, when does AI make traditional legal regimes 
obsolete? For example, autonomous driving vehicles may 
someday disrupt traditional liability regimes related to strict 
liability and negligence.182 The very nature of AI and the black 
box problem could prevent the legal system from determining 
whether there was a breach of duty, who was responsible, and 
whether the breach caused the damage. This has required 
                                                          
 181. GDPR, art. 6(1)(e). 
 182. See generally U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, TORTS OF 
THE FUTURE: AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 3–6 (2018) (addressing the liability and 
regulatory implications for autonomous vehicles). 
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engineers and legal teams to rethink the foundational principles 
of AI technologies.183 It also begs the question, when does AI 
break the mold, if at all, for cybersecurity and data protection? 
As noted in Part I, AI-based network defense systems are 
still primarily detect-and-respond tools that require significant 
human intervention.184 As they stand, these systems primarily 
assist network defenders in analyzing data and making 
connections to determine the context and nature of network 
activity.185 The fact that there remain significant levels of 
human control, as discussed in Section B, supports the idea that 
compliance, although challenging, may be possible in today’s 
system.186 GDPR compliance may hinder or slow progress, but 
there are no indications that it will fully inhibit the development 
and use of AI-based network defense systems. Notwithstanding, 
there should be serious concern moving forward as to whether 
compliance is feasible as the underlying technologies move 
towards greater autonomy. 
Ideally, these systems will be able to one day operate at 
“cyber” speed. In fact, they may have to as malicious actors and 
cyber criminals increasingly utilize AI to further nefarious 
activity.187 The future may very well be a battle of algorithms 
where competing systems act and react with little or no human 
intervention. In terms of the GDPR, the question becomes 
whether compliance is still feasible in the wake of greater 
autonomy. The black box problem is just one example of an area 
where compliance may be unachievable.188 The right to an 
explanation holds little weight when an explanation is not 
possible. This will require system developers to look for 
technological solutions that promote transparency from the 
beginning. Similarly, in the context of cyber threat information 
                                                          
 183. See generally Buckner, supra note 97 (answering questions pertaining 
to how engineers and legal teams must change their thinking about growing AI 
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 184. Supra Part I, Section B. 
 185. See Marty, supra note 60 (describing how machine learning algorithms 
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 186. Supra Part I, Section B. 
 187. See Danny Palmer, AI, Quantum Computing and 5G Could Make 
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sharing, fully autonomous systems may excel at communicating 
cyber threat information across systems and entities but may 
also be incapable of demonstrating that personal data was not 
shared. As suggested earlier, the only certainty is uncertainty.189 
Absent innovative technologies that can assure protected data is 
processed in accordance with regulations like the GDPR, it is 
likely that AI-based cybersecurity systems will break the mold. 
Moving forward, it is incumbent on engineers, lawmakers, and 
scholars in their respective fields to pursue technology and 
policies that balance the demands of cybersecurity with the need 
to protect data. 
For AI and cybersecurity, the problem space is immense, 
and the implications are likely to be significant. The demands of 
information security are often at odds with data privacy.190 
Meanwhile, rapid transformations in the threat landscape and 
changes in technology make it difficult to understand the 
broader picture of these competing domains.191 This poses 
challenges for all parties involved trying to balance respective 
interests and move society forward in the most effective fashion. 
If done correctly, a balanced regulatory scheme may be able to 
minimize data privacy issues in cybersecurity while prompting 
the overall development and implementation of autonomous 
information security systems. 
D. ENGINEERING POLICY: CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF 
AUTONOMOUS CYBERSECURITY 
Technology almost always outpaces the law. As technology 
builds upon technology, governing mechanisms often struggle to 
understand and account for the regulatory, ethical, and privacy 
considerations surrounding emerging technologies. Moreover, a 
lack of understanding of the technology itself often makes 
formulating policy difficult. Technology often not only outpaces 
our ability to defend but also our will to do so. AI is no exception. 
From the Internet to cybersecurity to big data and AI, there are 
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 190. See generally Danny Guaman, Software and Services Engineering: 
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intrinsic considerations related to data rights, privacy, 
intellectual property, ethics, due process, social values, and 
geopolitical concerns. Converging technologies complicate 
regulatory structures at all levels. While the law is lost in the 
fog of innovation, society struggles to harmonize the social 
challenges presented by such disruptive technologies. For 
machine learning and information security, the public puts a 
premium on privacy while still expecting the benefits of AI 
systems where the utility is derived from surpluses of consumer 
data.192 
Data privacy, or rather data protection, has received 
significant attention in the wake of weekly large-scale data 
breaches. This has caused technology firms and regulators to 
warm to the idea of federal privacy legislation.193 In the interest 
of cybersecurity and AI, there are several key considerations for 
a federal privacy statute that may drive the future of 
autonomous network defense. First, a federal privacy law may 
benefit from certain exemptions for data processing related to 
information security.194 This could include exemptions that 
permit automated sharing of cyber threat indicators so long as 
information is shared by approved or vetted systems or entities. 
A second consideration is the inclusion of liability limitations for 
small companies. While these exemptions would need to be 
uniquely tailored so as to not to defeat the purpose of the 
legislation, such exemptions would encourage smaller vendors 
and companies to employ more advanced systems.195 Depending 
on the state of the technology, the proliferation of more advanced 
                                                          
 192. See generally April F. Doss, Why Changes in Data Science Are Driving 
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2020] CYBERSECURITY, PRIVACY & AI 205 
 
systems may benefit the cybersecurity industry as a whole and 
shift the economics of cybersecurity in a positive fashion. 
Another consideration would be to outline permitted uses of 
anonymized196 and pseudonymized data.197 Because achieving 
full anonymization of data can be challenging, entities may be 
hesitant to use or share such information. Outlining permitted 
uses of anonymized and pseudonymized data would reduce 
uncertainty surrounding information sharing by clearly 
establishing instances where anonymized data sharing is 
appropriate. This would, however, also likely require 
standardization of certain data anonymization techniques. A 
similar consideration would be to define permitted uses of 
repurposed data without additional consent.198 In some 
instances, it is foreseeable that relevant information may be 
collected for a particular purpose but may be useful at a later 
time when the threat landscape has changed. Defining when it 
would be permissible to repurpose this data without additional 
consent would enable respective network defense entities to 
more rapidly respond to a threat. 
CONCLUSION 
Breakthroughs in the development of AI technologies 
continuously shift the application of AI from a conceptual dream 
to a tangible reality. As each technological advancement is 
reduced to practice, questions of law and policy surrounding AI 
become more complex and convoluted. In the context of 
information security, AI offers a spectrum of utility ranging from 
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automation that empowers analysts to protect a network to 
systems capable of thinking, learning, and acting in a manner 
more intelligent than humans. As the threat landscape expands, 
society is turning towards AI systems to combat growing cyber 
threats. Meanwhile, society struggles to harmonize data privacy 
concerns with technological realities. The GDPR has brought 
this discussion to the pinnacle of business considerations by 
regulating how data is to be protected. In today’s infant state, 
AI-based cybersecurity systems appear capable of tackling the 
challenge of compliance. However, the challenge becomes more 
difficult as these systems achieve greater autonomy. As the 
cybersecurity industry moves forward, it is paramount that 
engineers, legal experts, and society look to balance competing 
interests in cybersecurity and data privacy in order to realize the 
benefits afforded by AI technologies. 
 
